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THE 

FRENCH RAILROADS 

AND 

THE WAR 

THIRD PART 
AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION 



By 



Colonel LeHenaff and Captain Bornecque 






Translated by 

GEORGE T. SLADE 
1922 






To 

All Who Served In 

The Transportation Corps 

A. E. F. 



INTRODUCTION 

If it be true that we learn from experience and profit by our mistakes, 
it should be worth our while to review past, events and to draw from them 
lessons for future guidance. 

The activities of some of our Army services in France during the Great 
War have been ably set forth by those who took a leading part in directing 
them and shaping their policies, but others have lacked unofficial historians 
willing to compile the necessary records and publish the reports. Among 
the latter is the Transportation Corps, which was responsible for the move- 
ment of our troops and supplies, from their arrival in France before Novem- 
ber 11 1918, until their embarkation at the French ports after the signing 
of the armistice. 

The French, however, are more methodical than are we, and reports 
compiled by officers previously trained for, and during the war in charge of, 
various services are now being published. Among them, on a recent visit 
to Paris, it was my good fortune to find the one which deals with the French 
railroads during the war. 

The preface to this work was written by General Gassouin, who was the 
French Director General of Military Transportation during most of the 
year 1918, and to whose helpful cooperation much of the successful accom- 
plishment of our Transportation Corps was due. The body of the report 
was prepared by Colonel Le Henaff and Captain Bornecque. The former, 
a regular Army officer who had been assigned to the study of military trans- 
portation for many years before the war, was the French representative on 
the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee, organized to coordinate the 
French, British, Italian, Belgian and American land transportation eflforts, 
and was thus in constant touch with our problems of force and equipment 
as well as with our organization and methods. The latter, a university 
professor previous to the war, was in charge of the Army Postal Service 
and was probably more conversant with the location of our forces than any 
other officer in either the French or American Army. Both are, therefore, 
qualified to act as our critics. 

Frequent quotations are made by Colonel Le Henaff and Captain Bor- 
necque from the report of Lieutenant Colonel Andriot, who was the Regu- 
lating Commissioner attached to the Transportation Corps at Tours, and 



4 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

because of whose patience, tact and skill in meeting emergencies possible 
friction with the French railroad officers and their employees was always 
avoided. No one followed with greater attention the details of everything 
affecting American transportation than did Colonel Andriot and he was the 
ideal officer for the trying place he so successfully filled. 

One section of the book is devoted to American transportation, and is 
in the nature of an official report upon the accomplishments of our Trans- 
portation Corps from the French standpoint. Feeling that the officers of 
our Regular Army, the railroad officers who served in the Army in France 
and those who so ably operated the railroads at home during the war should 
have the opportunity of reading this part of the report, I asked for and 
obtained Colonel Le Henaff's consent to make a translation of it for private 
circulation. 

For a proper understanding of the article an introduction is required. 
None could be better qualified to write it than Colonel William J. Wilgus, 
who was a member of the Commission sent to France to study the railroad 
situation there soon after the Declaration of War by the United States on 
Germany in 1917, who remained at the request of General Pershing to deal 
with American transportation matters, and who served, with marked dis- 
tinction, in the Transportation Corps from its formation until after the 
armistice. We are indebted to him for the preface which follows. 

The Translator. 
New York, August, 1922. 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 



PREFACE 

In time, it is to be hoped, the stirring tale of the American Army's trans- 
portation achievements in France will be fittingly told, first, as an act of 
justice to men who served their country with unselfish devotion under most 
trying circumstances, and second, as a means of enlightenment for those upon 
whose shoulders a like burden may fall in the future. 

Meanwhile articles like the one under review from the pen of our for- 
mer Allies are warmly to be welcomed, even though they are incomplete and 
in some instances inaccurate. They have the merit of letting us see our- 
selves as others see us and they emphasize the need for hastening our own 
narrative from dependable sources. 

It should be borne in mind that the task of transporting our troops and 
supplies on the other side was not limited to the French railways. It also 
embraced the discharge of our ocean transports in the French ports; the 
highly important "European Service" consisting of movements by rail and 
water from the British Isles and other points in Europe and Africa to 
France ; the inland waterway service from the coast to the advance section ; 
and at the commencement and later at the end of our participation in the 
war, movements by "light railways" from the standard gage railheads to 
the front, as well as road construction and maintenance. 

How badly we were prepared for undertaking this task, and how near 
we came to failure through what the authors so well term "placing the cart 
before the horse in sending those to be transported in advance of the 
means of transport," may perhaps be made clear by briefly explaining the 
manner in which the problem was first approached, why the employment of 
our own "methods of getting results and building in a big way" were deemed 
by us to be absolutely necessary for our success and therefore that of 
the Allies, and why "the American Army never handled more than one-half 
of its traffic" on the French railways. 

An American railway Commission, made up largely of militarized civil- 
ians, was dispatched to France in mid-May 1917, shortly after the 
declaration of war. Curiously enough it was not instructed to look into 
the needs of our own army that was to follow, but rather to pass upon the 
propriety of the requests of Great Britain and France for immediate as- 
sistance in the way of railway troops and material. Having accomplished 



6 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

this purpose by the middle of the ensuing month, shortly after the arrival 
of General Pershing in France, the Commission was disbanded, and the one 
of its members who remained at the request of the Commander-in-Chief to 
deal with transportation matters soon realized that to him had fallen the 
lot of visualizing the transportation needs of an army of undetermined size, 
destined to fight in a sector as yet unselected, and calling for an unknown 
weight of supplies per man per day. 

Coupled with this embarrassing uncertainty as to the elements that lie 
at the root of an army transportation program, Avas the questionable ability 
of the French to supply the personnel and equipment required for the move- 
ment of our army and its supplies over the French railways. 

M. Claveille, then Under Secretary of Transportation for the French 
government, had assured the Commission that were he given six railway 
regiments with suitable tools, certain dock construction forces, three hun- 
dred consolidation locomotives and 2,000 kilometers of track materials, to- 
gether with ship space for moving railway materials purchased by his gov- 
ernment in America and then awaiting movement, the approval of all of 
which had been cabled by the Commission to Washington, he hoped to be 
able to meet our requirements. 

The frequent serious shortage in cars and locomotives suffered by the 
British Army at critical times, when diversions of equipment were required 
for the support of French advances, seemed to the newly appointed trans- 
portation officer to be the best kind of proof that it would be tempting prov- 
idence to rely too much on the "hope" of the French secretary, and so he 
took upon himself the responsibility of planning the transportation service 
on the theory that ultimately the bulk of American supplies would be 
handled in solid trains made up of American cars of the maximum capacity 
suited to French clearances and bridges, manned by American railway 
troops and hauled by American locomotives over French rails on the track- 
age-rights principle, between American-operated ports, and terminals 
stretching from the Atlantic coast to the front upwards of 500 miles inland. 

Another perplexing question was the volume of supplies for which pro- 
vision should be made in the planning. Those in the American army who 
were most competent to advise on this feature pointed to their experience 
in the Vera Cruz campaign, where the requirements averaged 100 pounds 
per man per day, while British and French consumption in the war then in 
progress was reported to average less than half that amount. A prompt 
decision being necessary the above mentioned officer assumed the responsi- 
bility of using 60 pounds per man per day, in which was included the nec- 
essary coal for moving our trains. Meticulous calculations made over a 
year later by a board appointed for that purpose bore out the correctness 
of this preliminary "guess." 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 7 

At this time the French had provided for our occupancy seventeen ship 
berths on the Atlantic seaboard, later to be increased to twenty-three 
through the construction of new facilities by our forces. Of these, 
eleven were in the Gironde River group centering at Bordeaux from whence 
our intended line of communication via the Paris-Orleans system led north- 
easterly up hill and down dale for a distance of some 250 miles to Bourges, 
and twelve were in the Loire River group centering at Saint-Nazaire and 
La Rochelle from whence our intended route via the Paris-Orleans system, 
supplemented by connecting branches of the State system, passed up the 
comparatively low-grade valleys of the Loire and Cher rivers for some 250 
miles to a connection with the other line just west of Bourges. Here the 
lines again split, the first or southerly one continuing via the Paris-Orleans 
system easterly to Nevers, thence via the Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean 
system through Dijon to a storage depot and regulating station at Is-sur- 
Tille and thence via several branches of the East system to railheads on the 
Epinal-Nancy front ; while the second line, via sections of the same three sys- 
tems, bore to the northeast through Clamecy, Auxerre and Saint-Florentin to 
a proposed regulating station at Liffol-le-Grand, serving the Saint-Mihiel 
front, with a diverging route from Saint-Florentin through Troyes to the 
French regulating station at Saint-Dizier in the rear of Verdun. A third 
route was also assigned to us, leading from Tours on the Loire River line to 
a junction with the last described route at Troyes, and thence to Saint-Dizier. 
The French estimated that these three lines of communication would be 
capable of handling 50,000 tons of American supplies daily, sufficient for an 
army of about 2,000,000 men. The capacity of the ship berths assigned to 
us was barely one-fifth of that amount. 

In this connection it is well to note that the French high command rec- 
ommended that our organization "should correspond to the needs of an 
army of 300,000 men and, when completed, should be followed by succes- 
sive sections of 300,000 men, if necessary to 2,000,000 men." 

Another matter worthy of note was the hesitancy that attended the se- 
lection of the sector in which our troops would operate, and therefore the 
objective toward which our transportation machine should be moulded. 
The French favored our occupancy of the Lorraine sector, referred to by 
the authors, and while this was concurred in by our Commander-in-Chief he 
also considered that the so-called "sacred triangle" (Issoudun, Vierzon, 
Bourges) should be the hinge on which he would be enabled to turn his 
forces at will to meet critical emergencies that might develop to the north, 
as well as to the northeast and east. 

It will thus be seen that in the early days of our participation in the war 
there was no certainty that the French railways, even with the aid they had 



8 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

requested, would be able efficiently to transport our troops and supplies. 
It will also be seen that the size of our Army, the precise location of its ac- 
tivities and the needed volume of its supplies were still matters of con- 
jecture. 

Much of what is here recorded did not develop until several weeks later 
and therefore was not available as a means of guidance in the laying down 
of the transportation needs of the Army in late June and early July 1917, 
at which time the transportation requisition (usually referred to as No. 6) 
was prepared on the theory of American operation of American supply 
trains and, on the arbitrary assumption of the transportation officer, that 
our force within a year would number 500,000 fighting men, equal to 750,- 
000 to 800,000 men including service troops, stationed on a forty mile front 
in the Lorraine sector, to which access would be had over the aforesaid routes. 

In this requisition, cabled to Washington in mid- July 1917, were includ- 
ed 760 miles of track with accessories, 570 miles of telephone installation, 
700 consolidation locomotives of the same type as the 300 ordered in behalf 
of the French, 9,500 freight cars of a capacity of "upwards of 20 tons" each 
(30 tons was found to be the maximum adaptable to French conditions and 
was so furnished), 60 water stations with accessories, 16 engine-house equip- 
ments, 10 ambulance trains, 60 electric gantry dock cranes, materials for 
6,000 lineal feet of wharf, equal to 15 ship berths, and complete equipment 
for a general repair shop, all for standard gage railways. Also there were 
included 480 miles of track with accessories, 330 miles of telephone installa- 
tion, 384 locomotives, 3,332 cars, 48 water stations with accessories, 16 
engine-house equipments and one general repair shop complete, for light (60 
c. m. gauge) railways, together with many miscellaneous items, such as loco- 
motive cranes, steamshovels, pile drivers, lighting facilities, and other tools 
and appliances, as well as bridge and other construction materials. 

Within the next three months the standard gage order was increased 
from 9,500 to 19,600 thirty-ton cars; an arrangement was concluded where- 
by the 300 locomotives ordered in behalf of the French and 425 "bad-order" 
Belgian locoma;tives were to be assigned to our use; sundry floating equip- 
ment comprising tugs, tenders, barges and floating derricks were requisi- 
tioned from the United States, and arrangements were made for car and 
locomotive erecting plants. 

Coincidentally with the early placing of orders for railway materials 
plans were initiated for two new ports, one of ten berths at Bassens near 
Bordeaux, and another of five berths on the Loire River; also for storage 
depots and terminals for the base sections near Bassens and Saint-Nazaire, 
for the intermediate sections at Gievres, Chateauroux (Montierchaume), 
Issoudun and Mehun, and for the advance section at Is-sur-Tille. 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 9 

Thought was also given to the solving of the difficult problem of knitting 
together the various branches of the four independent French railway sys- 
tems intended for our use, so as to make of them through east and west 
routes properly suited to the continuous movement of our trains. 

For personnel 72,350 men were requested, of whom 27,650 were for 
roads and light railways, leaving 44,700 applicable to standard gage rail- 
way and port purposes. 

From this brief recital it is apparent that the task of transporting the 
American Army was no easy one. The distance to be overcome in France 
was from eight to ten times that encountered by the British who were fortu- 
nate in having possession of the Channel ports, within an average of some 
50 miles from their section on the front. Moreover our base of supplies 
was some 3,000 miles away, on the other side of a submarine infested sea, 
which enormously added to our difficulties in the way of both transportation 
and interchange of thought. It was necessary to "build in a big way," and 
it was the part of wisdom to anticipate the coming of a great army for the 
transportation of which the Americans, in the end, would largely have to de- 
pend on themselves. In this there was no "contempt for the antiquated 
methods of the Old World," but rather a growing respect for their adapt- 
ability to their environment. Neither was there a failure to "give thorough 
consideration to the existing organization." It was a case of meeting a 
grave situation boldly, in the belief that the American Army should be able 
to take care of itself. Time proved the correctness of this course. 

Recognizing that a clear-cut organization under a single responsible 
head was essential to success, the newly appointed head of the Transporta- 
tion Corps, as soon as he was in possession of an office force in mid-August 
1917, formally placed in writing his oft repeated previous recommendation 
for the immediate obtaining from home of an experienced staff, consisting 
of a manager of railway transportation and ports, a manager of equipment, 
a manager of business affairs, a manager of light railways and a manager 
of construction, all with a view to handling the design, construction, main- 
tenance and operation of railways and ports, including the discharge of 
ships. Construction of transportation projects was to be under this organ- 
ization, after the arrival in France of sufficient service troops to serve the 
needs of both the Director of Railways and the Engineer Officer. This was 
approved without reserve by the Commander-in-Chief, who expressed his 
desire that the Director of Railways should have a free hand in the dis- 
charge of his responsibilities. 

Thus we see that provision was early made for what the authors very 
properly point to as essential to complete success — "a single directing force 



10 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

* * * * over the entire system of communication, from the shores of France 

* * * * to the Lorraine front." 

Unfortunately fate decreed that this efficient arrangement was not to 
continue. Differences of opinion arose in the newly organized general 
staff of the American Army and the later appointed Director General of 
Transportation was removed from direct contact with the Commander-in- 
Chief and shorn of his duties in connection with light railways, roads, con- 
struction, and much of the transportation of troops and supplies in the ad- 
vance section. There were added to his duties the departments of 
"European Service," mentioned above, and "Inland Waterways." The crit- 
ical transportation conditions that followed the armistice brought about a 
restoration of the original conception of a single responsible head in charge 
of all phases of transportation, extending from the sea to the front, a con- 
ception that was sound and from which there never should have been a de- 
parture. 

From the inceptional stage of the American Expeditionary Forces in 
the summer of 1917, to the winter of 1918, the growth in size of the Army 
was discouragingly small, the total number of men in France on January 
1st 1918 being less than 160,000, although our people at home were under 
the impression that it was upwards of half a million. Then the impending 
German drive, in the spring of 1918, brought about British aid to our 
ocean transport service, and with the increase of shipping, our troop move- 
ment rapidly grew from some 33,000 in February to upwards of 160,000 
in May, 300,000 in July, 242,000 in August, 312,000 in September, and 
218,000 in October. At the close of hostilities we had nearly 2,000,000 
men in France. The movement of supplies likewise increased. From June 
1917 to February 1918 it had grown from approximately 85,000 tons to 
190,000 tons per month, an average increase of but 13,000 tons per month. 
Then it took a marked turn upward and grew each month at the average 
rate of 90,000 tons over the previous period, so that in the month of Novem- 
ber 1918 the total discharged at 89 berths assigned to us in 31 ports was, 
in round figures, 921,000 tons, or nearly 31,000 tons daily, of which 70^ 
came from the United States and 30^ from Old World sources. 

Sad to relate at no stage of the growth of the Army were "the means 
of transport sent in advance of those to be transported" either as to per- 
sonnel or material. In answer to the constant cry of the Transportation 
Corps for the prompt furnishing of its necessities of personnel and materi- 
al, there was the unvarying response tliat the urgent demand of Marshal 
Foch for rifles on the firing line made imperative that the limited amount 
of ocean shipping should be used for transporting combat troops and their 
subsistence. The cart was indeed placed before the horse, but only against 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 11 

the protests of the Transportation Corps, which clearly saw that carried 
to its logical conclusion only disaster could result from such a course. Hap- 
pily the armistice came in time to save the day. 

It was not until mid-summer of 1918 that the Transportation Corps was 
informed that it would be expected to meet the needs of an army of up- 
wards of 4,500,000 men by June of the following year, whereupon its req- 
uisitions were immediately increased from those previously rendered to a 
total of 4,000 locomotives, including those supplied by the Belgians, 98,000 
freight cars, 36 engine-house equipments, 101 tugs and tenders, 798 barges 
and lighters, 18 floating derricks, 736 cranes, two locomotive general repair 
shops, five locomotive and car erecting shops, and many other items, all of 
which would have had to be very materially increased for an advance of 
some 200 miles to the Rhine. At the same time measures were taken, in 
cooperation with the French, to increase our vessel berths to a total of 150, 
with a discharge capacity of 101,000 tons daily, stretching from Le Havre 
on the Channel to Toulon on the Mediterranean, together with additional 
main lines of communication reaching inland from Le Havre, Brest and Mar- 
seille. Likewise the demand for personnel was increased to a total of 
206,000. 

At the signing of the armistice there were, in round figures, in the ser- 
vice of the Transportation Corps, 1,284 locomotives, 13,360 cars, 19 tugs 
and tenders, 2 floating cranes, 51 barges and lighters, 1 locomotive erecting 
shop, 1 locomotive general repair shop, 2 car erecting shops, 4 ship repair 
plants and 49,000 men. Of the latter nearly 6,000 were assigned to the 
French, of whom over one-half were engaged in repairing French cars and 
locomotives. 

The authors consider that we did a limited amount of work in France. 
Unquestionably we did not do what we should have done, but, after all, 
the accomplishments of the members of the Transportation Corps were not 
inconsiderable. In accordance with their designs and under their super- 
vision approximately 380 construction projects were under way at the close 
of hostilities, of which 80^ were manned with American troops. In this 
imposing list were embraced a wide variety of items, such as new ports and 
the improvement of old ones, terminals, multiple tracking, cut-offs, side 
track and water supply extensions, shops, engine houses, regulating sta- 
tions and a multitude of less important features. In all, the Corps handled 
more than 9,500,000 tons at the ports, and disembarked and embarked nearly 
2,000,000 troops. Its force at the peak following the armistice numbered 
nearly 2,000 officers and over 58,000 men, while its authorized strength 
was in excess of 200,000. It operated its own terminals and repair facili- 
ties, and, to a growing degree, its own trains over French rails, and furnish- 
ed assistance to the French for running theirs. In doing this as many as 342 



12 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

trains^ manned in whole or part by American troops, were moved on one 
day (November 9, 1918) and to a greater or less degree the Americans 
had to do with the operation of their troops and supplies oh nearly 6,000 
miles of railway, on which the haul from 31 ports to railheads at the front 
was as high as 582 miles. It erected 18,664 cars and 1,610 locomotives, 
and aided the French by repairing some 2,000 of their locomotives and 
nearly 60,000 of their cars. It operated as many as 116 vessels, carrying 
286,000 tons per month between Old World points. It initiated and de- 
signed the work which was executed in its behalf by another branch of the 
Army, and it did its own visualizing for the future. 

Despite this record of achievement the fact remains that the trans- 
portation of the Army was in a parlous condition in the summer and fall 
of 1918, for the reason given by the authors, — "the putting of the cart be- 
fore the horse". There was a dangerous shortage of personnel and equip- 
ment, the construction of essential projects was far behind the schedule, 
and there was a pronounced lack of all of the elements necessary for fol- 
lowing up the enemy in case he should fall back to the Rhine, not only on 
our part but also on the part of all of the Allies. Then too, there was the 
faulty transportation organization. 

All in all it was well for the Allies that the German yielded as he did, 
instead of retreating far enough to be beyond their ability promptly to 
follow him. "In sending those to be transported in advance of the means 
of transport" the Allies took a gambler's chance — and won. 

There are some of the authors' statements which require correction 
in the interest of historical accuracy and this no doubt will be done when 
the full story is told. The relation of the Corps to the section commanders ; 
the composition of the regimental and battalion units; the volume of sup- 
plies held in storage at the ports, intermediate depots and the front; and 
the traffic and operating statistics, and other features call for a more extend- 
ed treatment than would be proper here. 

In concluding this preface it seems proper again to endorse the findings 
at the end of the authors' paper, and in doing so to express the ardent hope 
that our peace-time army will study our short-comings in France with a 
view to avoiding them should we have another call to arms. The failure 
of great conflicts may usually be traced to a break-down in transportation. 
Why should we not profit in this regard from the lessons of the past and 
be prepared when the call may come again? It may save the day. 

New York, August, 1922. William J. Wilgus. 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 13 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR. 

1922. 

BY COL. LeHENAFF AND CAPTAIN BORNECQUE. 

THIRD PART 
AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION/ 

I. GENERAL CONDITIONS. 

The American cooperation on the Western Front 
The Difficulties. offered two great transportation problems ; transpor- 
tation by sea, which at first the Americans attempted to handle alone, later 
with the aid of the British; and land transportation, the burden of which 
rested on the French railroads. 

It must be remembered that ocean transportation, at the time when sub- 
marine activities were the greatest, presented enormous difficulties; but 
for this reason the irregularity of the arrival of vessels at the ports had 
an unfortunate reaction upon land transportation, and was reflected in an 
additional burden on that service. 

From the standpoint of transportation by rail it would have been logi- 
cal had means (railroad men, equipment and facilities) been provided be- 
fore the arrival of the main body of combatants; but the young American 
Army had no such organized services; the transportation service, for 
example, had to be built from the ground up by recruiting its forces from 
the American railroads; and furthermore it was necessary to construct 
the locomotives and cars after designs suited to the French railroad operat- 
ing conditions. 

There were long delays before results were secured. Furthermore, the 
French High Command was anxious to see the combatants, whose instruc- 
tion was necessary, on the ground without delay. This anxiety was trans- 



*Among other documents, we have consulted, with the greatest profit, the report which 
Lieutenant Colonel Andriot, Regulating Commissioner attached to the American services, has 
made upon the rail transportation of the American Anny in France. 



14 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

formed into pressing haste beginning with April 1918, and that explains 
why, in forwarding American troops and equipment, "the cart was put 
before the horse" in sending those to be transported in advance of the means 
of transport. 

The results of this policy could not be other than burdensome for the 
French railroad systems. There were only available at first their existing 
facilities and the facilities of the French ports, such as they were. Now 
both, designed for normal traffic, were being worked to the extreme limit of 
their capacity; the force was out of breath from lack of needed rest and 
the facilities, insufficient even for peace-time business, could only be in- 
creased within the army zone because of lack of men and material. 

Thus, while the British had progressively adapted themselves to the 
situation in France little by little as their Army grew, the Americans arrived 
with the assurance which the immediate coming of two millions of men 
gives and also with a certain degree of contempt for the antiquated methods 
of the Old World. 

Anxious to show new methods of getting results and to build in a big 
way, they did not give enough consideration to the fact that they had come 
into the midst of an organization which could not be reformed in a few 
months and which, after all, had proved its worth. 

What further complicated the problem was the 
Effort Required of the decision to group the American Armies on the 

right of the front. It would have been logical 
to place them, as the British had been placed, in a zone as close as possible 
to their ocean bases. Military and political considerations forced another 
solution of the problem but that, in requiring not only a loaded but also an 
empty movement of cars entirely across France, increased the burden and 
added to the difficulties of the French railroads. 

On the other hand, the scarcity of ocean tonnage confined it to troop 
movements and to the supplies which it was impossible to find in France. 
For the rest, wood, road building materials, etc., a new call was made upon 
the French national resources and in consequence upon the French rail- 
roads. 

A formidable task had therefore to be faced, and the establishment of 
the American lines of communication felt the consequences of some little 
hesitation in reaching a decision. 

II. THE PLAN. 

p . Given the number of men and the tonnage to be received, 

it immediately appeared necessary to divide them between all 
of the available French ports, that is the Atlantic ports. Those of the En- 
glish Channel were almost used to capacity because of the traffic between 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 16 

England and France, while the activity of the submarines in the Mediter- 
ranean in 1917 foreclosed the possibility of using its ports. But when the 
submarine was later somewhat controlled and it was absolutely essential to 
enlarge the initial program, Marseille and Toulon were added to the list of 
American ports. At the same time Le Havre, Rouen and Cherbourg were 
used for some American traffic coming from England. 

Among the Atlantic ports Brest, the only deep water harbor, received 
most of the troops. Saint-Nazaire and Bordeaux (Bassens) handled a very 
large traffic, and Nantes, La Pallice and Rochefort were also used as were 
later on, but rather as auxiliaries, the smaller ports at Granville, Saint 
Malo, Les Sables-d'Olonne, Marans, Tonnay-Charente and Bayonne. 

As the American troops were to be concentrat- 

^ Allies Of ed in Lorraine, as we have indicated, the American 

Communication. ,, , . . , i t- t, 

lines 01 communication had to cross Jb ranee. But 

these lines could not follow the great peace time arteries of communication 
which pass through the Paris belt railroads, as they were already over- 
loaded and had to be kept open for French interchange movements. The 
traffic had therefore to be moved by other routes. 

The two lines of communication originally adopted both converged at 
Is-sur-Tille, the regulating station serving the district of Verdun, Nancy, 
Luneville, Saint-Die and, if necessary, Belfort. 

The first, called the "North Line," from Saint-Nazaire followed the 
main line from Le Croisic to Paris as far as Saint-Pierre-des-Corps, then 
the East and West line via Tours, Vierzon, Bourges, Saincaize and Nevers 
to Chagny, from there the Marseille to Paris line to Dijon-Perrigny, avoid- 
ing the terminal at that point by using a line around the city, and so to 
Is-sur-Tille. 

The second, called the "South Line," starting at Bordeaux-Bassens, fol- 
lowed as far as Coutras the main line carrying both the Bordeaux-Paris 
and Bordeaux-Limoges traffic, from Coutras to Limoges the line carrying the 
latter, from Limoges to Issoudun the line carrying the Toulouse-Paris traf- 
fic, then on a branch line passing by Saint-Florent, from Issoudun to 
Bourges, where it joined the North line. 

These two routes made use of some part of all the principal French 
through commercial lines, from the Paris-Saint-Nazaire line to the line from 
Paris to Marseille via Burgundy. 

In addition to using parts of these heavy traffic lines for their principal 
through routes the Americans also used, to a less extent, other lines carrying 
a large volume of business. One, that from Brest, is the main Paris line 
and was used as far as Le Mans where the American business was diverted 
to the single track line (the double tracking of which was commenced) to 
Tours; another, concentrating at Niort the traffic from La Rochelle-Pallice 



16 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

and Rochefort, ran by way of Thouars and Saumur, and still another, from 
the commencement of the use of the port of Marseille, was that from Mar- 
seille to Chagny. The first was principally used for the movement of troop 
trains. 

There was also provided, for traffic coming from England, service on 
various lines, at first from Le Havre to Is-sur-Tille via Paris or by Orleans 
and Vierzon, and later on numerous others. 

In the original program the common track from Bourges to Is-sur-Tille 
by Nevers and Chagny appeared adequate for an army of a million men. 
As soon as the American effectives should exceed this figure it was proposed 
to use two new routes to the front, diverging from those previously 
mentioned, i. e. Bourges to Cbatillon-sur-Seine by Cosne, Laroche, Saint- 
Florentin and Nuits-sous-Ravieres, and Saint-Pierre-des-Corps to Sens by 
Les Aubrais and Montargis. 

It was to provide for these operations that plans were made to four 
track the line from Laroche to Saint-Florentin for a distance of thirteen 
kilometers, in order not to interfere with the Paris-Dijon traffic, and to 
provide the regulating station at Liffol-le-Grand and another at Poincon, 
when, with the increase in the number of effectives, that at Is-sur-Tille 
became inadequate. 

The manner in which the American troops were located, as circumstances 
later determined, required frequent temporary changes in the details of this 
general plan. It was necessary, for example, because of the enormous 
number of troops arriving during the third quarter of 1918, to establish a 
route from Brest to Bar-sur-Aube by using the Paris belt lines already over- 
loaded with French traffic. 

When it was proposed to place a part of the American Army between the 
French and British Armies, a study of routes for its movement and supply 
through Rouen or Oissel, by way of Tours, Chateau-du-Loir and Le Mans to 
Serquigny, either by Argentan and Mezidon or by Laigle and Conches, was 
made. This would have given connections with all of the ports used by the 
American Army and their various bases of supply. A regulating station 
would have been established in the vicinity of Surdon. 

Certain portions of almost all of these lines had 
The Construction. heavy grades and many were poorly equipped for 
dense traffic. Furthermore the yards at the connections between the 
different lines used were located with respect to movements in other 
directions, and had neither adequate transfer nor interchange tracks. Hence 
the necessity for much construction work done at a time when both skilled 
labor and material were difficult to obtain. 

In fact, it at once appeared necessary, in order to intensify the train 
movement, to increase the number of block stations, to provide additional 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 17 

water supplies, to enlarge the existing yards and to lengthen various tracks 
(the American freight trains being longer than those of the French), and to 
augment, and in some cases entirely construct, the telephone lines which 
were practically non-existent on the railroads of central France. 

The Paris-Orleans system alone installed 72 new blocks, of which 38 
were on the line from Saint-Nazaire to Saincaize and 24 on that from 
Bordeaux to Bourges. It lengthened 25 passing tracks. It also increased 
the number of yard tracks in the terminals at Coutras, Limoges, Puy-Imbert 
Chateauroux, Saint-Pierre-des-Corps and Vierzon, and at various other 
points provided increased trackage. It built a direct connection at Perigueux 
between the Coutras and Limoges lines to avoid a back up movement; four 
tracked the line between Pont-Vert and Bourges for a distance of six kilo- 
meters; rearranged the yard at Bourges to separate the Bordeaux-Bourges 
and Saint-Nazaire-Bourges traflSc; provided new junctions at Saint-Pierre- 
des-Corps and Vierzon to separate the movements through these yards. 

These projects were developed in accordance with a plan which the High 
Command sometimes considered too conservative 

The P. L. M. system enlarged the yards at Montargis, Nevers, Saincaize 
and Montchanin, and extended the yard at Perrigny by constructing a direct 
connection with the Burgundy line. 

The East system separated grades at Langres and Chaudenay to avoid 
grade crossings for the Is-sur-Tille-Neufchateau and Paris-Belfort traflSic, 
and built a connection between the Merrey-Neufchateau and Neufchateau- 
Chaumont lines to serve the new yard at Li£fol. The yards at Chalindrey, 
Langres, Merrey, Neufchateau, Barisey-la-Cote, Mirecourt, Pont-Saint- 
Vincent and Blainville were improved. 

The State system built a single track connection at Saumur to join the 
Paris-Bordeaux and Tours-Angers lines, and another at Sainte-Luce to join 
the Segre-Nantes and the Tours-Nantes lines. There was a considerable 
addition made to the classification yard at Thouars. 

These improvements proved insufficient. Following the German advance 
in the spring of 1918 and the consequent increase in the American transpor- 
tation requirements, an important classification yard was built at Saint- 
Come, near Tours, to relieve that at Saint-Pierre-des-Corps; the line from 
Tours to Le Mans was double tracked; the tracks under construction at 
Vierzon, Chateauroux and Puy-Imbert were extended. 

On the P. L. M. system important construction work was undertaken in 
the vicinity of Marseille, especially at the port of Arenc, in order to increase 
the capacity of the line through the Pinede mountain range. At the same 
time improvements were made at different points on the main line between 
Marseille and Chagny, in order to increase its capacity. Among these were 
yard tracks and engine houses at Portes, Avignon and Miramas. 



18 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

The Americans gave only limited assistance in carry- 
American j^g q^|. t^ggg projects, their construction forces having 

arrived rather slowly. In fact, outside of their great 
yards and great warehouse terminals (in connection with which they laid 
2400 kilometers of track), they only built the second track through Nantes 
and the alternate line leaving the Bourbonnais line at Challuy (half way 
between Saincaize and Nevers) and connecting at Harlot on the Nevers- 
Chagny line. This connecting line which crossed the River Loire on a long 
trestle kept out of the yard at Nevers traffic between Bourges, Saincaize, 
Cercy-la-Tour, Montchanin, Chagny and Perrigny. Commenced at the 
beginning of 1918, it was opened for traffic October 23. It was a double 
track line 8.7 kilometers in length. 

At the same time the French railroads had to meet the requirements of 
a traffic over 40^ in excess of that of 1913, with 17% fewer employees, 
5^0 fewer locomotives and 9% fewer cars. They were therefore unable 
to furnish the 1,700 locomotives, the 26,000 freight cars of 30 tons capacity, 
the 2,500 coaches for soldiers, wounded and men on leave, and the 52,000 
railroad men required in October 1918, for American transportation alone. 
And the requirements in May 1919 would have been more than double these 
figures. 

There was therefore established a program which contemplated, begin- 
ning with the spring of 1918, the use of complete American trains made up 
at the American terminals either of American cars after their erection or 
of French cars, destined to the American warehouse terminals and to the 
front, which would not require handling in the French yards. These trains 
were to be moved by American locomotives and crews, and through entirely 
independent terminals. 

While awaiting the arrival of the American equipment to realize this 
program, and on the assumption that the proposed method of operation 
would prove practical, the transportation burden rested upon the French 
railroads. They were also required to furnish the instructors needed to 
give the American engineers, firemen and trainmen technical instructions in 
the French rules, and later to teach them the lines over which they were to 
operate. 

Even when the realization of this program was most advanced the 
French railroads were forced to provide each American train with a pilot, 
because of the difference of language; as it would have been very diffi- 
cult, in case of accident or delay on the main line, for the Americans to 
consult with the French regarding the action to be taken. Because of the 
increase in density of traffic it was also necessary to provide additional 
force at junctions, at the approaches to the American yards, to double the 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 19 

number of switch tenders, to increase the supervision, to open for night ser- 
vice stations hitherto only open during the day, and to maintain with greater 
care track and signals. 

The realization of this program was slow and it was never completely 
accomplished because of the insufficiency of American force and equipment. 

The number of American railroad men should have been as follows : 
September 1 1918 29,896, October 1 42,544, November 1 52,030. In re- 
ality the actual figures were 27,320, 28,484 and 30,410, a final deficit 
of 40%. 

In the same way it was agreed, on August 10 1918, that locomotives 
should come from the United States at the rate of 268 per month and cars 
at the rate of 7,550 per month. For the two months of September and 
October the arrivals were, 258 locomotives instead of 536, and 5,164 cars 
instead of 15,100. 

III. THE ORGANIZATION. 

The traffic, we have seen, moved over different 
tiegiliaiing ^ French railroads. The necessity for coordinating the 

Commission. ^ , . , , . i , 

movement oi business between them required the cre- 
ation of some form of liaison, which would bring together the American 
command on the one hand and the French railroads on the other. As a 
result the regulating commission of the American lines of communication 
was established at Tours March 18 1918. It included, besides officers, 
technical assistants assigned by each of the principal lines in central 
France. It reported at first directly to the Fourth Bureau of the General 
Staff of the Army, but, after July 20 1918, to the Director General of 
Military Transportation. 

At first divided into two separate commissions, one at Tours for the 
North lines the other at Perigueux for the South lines, it was soon central- 
ized at Tours with authority in everything affecting the American lines of 
communication over all of the principal lines in central France. On August 
5 a regulating commission was established at Marseille for the South-East 
lines, i. e. the part of the P. L. M. system south and east of the Saincaize, 
Chagny, Dijon, Is-sur-Tille line, adjoining the zones of the regulating 
commissions of the front. 

The object of these commissions was to study and provide the trans- 
portation required by the American Army, between the ports, its various 
warehouse and other plants, and the front. The organizations functioned 
through a military office in direct relation with the American Transpor- 
tation Service, and a technical office in direct relation with the railroads. 
Representatives were placed at the principal ports (Marseille, Bordeaux, 
La Rochelle, Saint-Nazaire, Nantes and Brest), and at the principal 



20 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

American establishments (Montierchaume, Gievres, Le Mans and Miramas). 
The commissions had authority over the army representatives at all stations 
in so far as American transportation was concerned. They were provided 
with special telephone service and were given the use of the American 
telephone lines. 

To assure the movement of American trains the regulating commissions 
had authority to schedule a certain number of these trains daily on each of 
the different lines. 

Everything affecting transportation on all of the lines of communica- 
tion, from and including the making up of a train, was in the hands of a 
single authority, the French regulating officer or his representative, in co- 
operation with the American authorities. 

The American railway service (Transportation Corps) 

/^^'^"''^^ . was a part of an important organization which 

* successively bore the names, "Lines of Communication," 

"Service of the Rear," and finally, "Services of Supply" (abbreviation S. 

O. S.). Its headquarters were first at Paris then, after February 1918, 

at Tours. 

At the head of the S. O. S. was a Major General in charge of a staff 
divided into four bureaus. 

Through these bureaus various services were supervised and among the 
latter was included the transportation service, directed by a Brigadier Gen- 
eral, the Director General of Transportation (D. G. T.). 

The orders of the Commanding General of the S. O. S. were trans- 
mitted to the different American establishments, scattered over France, 
through general officers who directed a certain number of "sections" 
divided territorially. These were, the base sections at Saint-Nazaire, Bor- 
deaux, Le Havre, Brest, Marseille and La Rochelle, the intermediate sec- 
tion at Nevers, independent districts at Tours and Paris, and the advance 
section corresponding with the zone of the Armies. 

The D. G. T., responsible for all branches of the transportation service, 
assigned a representative to each regulating station, to each supply depot 
and to each important railroad station, to facilitate the movement of mili- 
tary traffic. 

The lines of communication were divided into districts, at first called 
lines A, B, etc., but which afterward went by the names of "Grand 
Divisions," each covering five to eight hundred kilompters of line. A Gen- 
eral Superintendent with the rank of Major or Lieutenant Colonel was in 
charge of a Grand Division, and reported directly to the "General Man- 
ager," a Colonel, assistant to the D. G. T. 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 21 

The D. G. T. had under his direction troops organized 
im •*****'' ^'*'* very much as are those of our campaign railroad forces. 
* The organic unit was the railroad battalion. These were 

of three sorts, the operating battalion, made up of operating railroad men 
organized to handle 15 trains in each direction on a line of 500 kilometers 
with 100 locomotives, the maintenance battalion for track construction and 
maintenance, and the shop battalion for the maintenance of equipment. 
The battalions were divided into companies and grouped into regiments. 

At the front, transportation was directed by the French services as- 
signed to the headquarters at Chaumont, and to the regulating stations at 
Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand. 

Let us always hail the arrival in the line of the American Divisions. 
On October 27 1917, an early communique of General Pershing announced 
the presence of American Infantry and Artillery in the first line. These 
were not merely isolated units. In February 1918, the 26th American 
Infantry Division embarked at Chatenois, Neufchateu and Liffol for Sois- 
sons and Braisnes, the 4i2nd at Rolampont and Langres for Luneville and 
Saint-Clement at the beginning of March, and the 2nd left Breuvannes and 
Bourmont (the artillery from Besancon) for Lemmes and Dugny. 

IV. THE TRANSPORTATION METHODS. 

A. TRANSPORTATION TO THE FRONT. 

But the organization of the bases and the 
Camps of Instruction ^-^^^ ^f communication were not all the prob- 

and Supply Storage. t,, * • . ij ^ u ^ 

lem. The American troops could not be put 

under fire until they were trained and equipped, nor could supplies be pushed 

to the front without regard to what they were or the rate at which they 

were required. For these reasons camps of instruction for the troops and 

depots for supplies were established. 

For the troops camp zones were arranged, both near the Argonne and 
Lorraine fronts in the vicinity of Mirecourt, Toul, Troyes and Is-sur-Tille, 
and in Central France, as near as possible to the lines of communication. 

The artillery brigades were trained in the French camps at Valdahon, 
Meucon, Coetquidan, La Courtine and Souge. If there were added the 
hospital organizations and the rest areas, which will be mentioned later, 
the American troops were distributed over half if not two-thirds of France. 

The supplies were distributed in three zones, that of the ports carrying 
sufficient for forty-five days, that of the intermediate section carrying 
thirty days' supply, and at the front supplies for fifteen days. The stor- 
age warehouses for the ports were to be at Miramas near Marseille, at 
Saint-Sulpice-Izon near Bordeaux, at Talmont near the mouth of the 
Gironde River, Aigrefeuille not far from Rochefort and La Rochelle, at 



22 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

Montoir for the Saint-Nazaire ports, at Sainte-Luce for Nantes, and at 
Pleyber-Christ for Brest. However at the time of the armistice none of 
these depots was complete, but Saint-Sulpice-Izon, Montoir and Sainte-Luce 
were well advanced. Talmont had hardly been staked out. The interme- 
diate depots were at Gievres and Montierchaume, and those at the front 
were Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand. 

Of all of these installations Gievres was the most important. It extended 
along the Tours- Vierzon line of the P. O. in a parallelogram nine kilometers 
long by three wide. It had more than 140 warehouses covering about 90 
acres, and over 235 acres of open air storage, all served by 213 kilometers 
of track. 500 officers and 1,500 enlisted men were required to direct and 
handle its various departments. 

The warehouses were placed in long parallel files, grouped in separate 
sections, and served by double tracks to assure an uninterrupted movement 
of the cars from west to east (from the ports toward the front) whether 
forwarded with the original lading or reworked. 

A round house, repair shops for locomotives and cars, a stock yard for 
the remount service, a salvage depot, a soap factory and a refrigerating 
plant completed the city. 

To summarize. In every case troops and supplies 
I he I roubles ^^^ ^^ ^^ carried from the ports across France. This 
in the Ports. , ,,,.,.,, 

was the primary trouble tor which, let us at once admit, 
only a partial cure was ever found. "The ports" wrote Colonel Andriot, 
"have almost constantly suffered during 1918 because of car shortage. 
Everything combines to make it difficult to furnish cars, the lack of business 
in the interior to bring them to the ports under load, the distance of the 
points at which they are released making a return empty movement across 
France, frequent congestion in the yards at the front due to the fluctuations 
of the battle and negligence in unloading, emergencies of every sort con- 
stantly affecting operations, shortage of force and motive power, irregular 
movement, etc. The time of a round trip for a car between port and front, 
estimated at ten or twelve days, is increased because of these various 
causes by percentages often enormous. The American services suffer with 
the rest from shortage of cars in the ports. They have quite properly re- 
served the U. S. A. cars for their own exclusive use, but there are not enough 
of them, 3,211 on June 30, 4,241 July 31, and 6,205 on August 30." 

On the other hand, for reasons pertaining partly to the submarine war- 
fare and partly to our ports, the American troops did not always disembark 
at the point nearest the camp to which they were assigned. Concrete cases 
cited by Colonel Andriot are: in July fourteen trains of troops were moved 
from Brest to Bordeaux and five to Saint-Nazaire, and in September eight 
trains of troops were moved from Brest to Bordeaux and three to Saint- 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 23 

Nazaire. The disembarkation of these troops directly at their port of des- 
tination would have saved to the railroads over 22,000 kilometers of loaded 
train movement and as much more light to balance power. It does not ap- 
pear that, had the effort been made, the situation could not have been im- 
proved by a proper assignment of the American troops to the French ports. 

To these troubles were added those which the human mind was power- 
less to foresee. The German offensive of March 1918 brought about the 
Allied request that the United States double its program and reduce by one- 
half the time for its realization. One hundred divisions were to be sent to 
France before the spring of 1919, at the rate of 300,000 men per month. 

Moreover, the arrivals of troops and supplies increased with great ra- 
pidity. There were 22,000 American soldiers in France in July 1917, in 
August 40,000, on January 1 1918 145,000, on May 1 290,000. In May 
93,000 arrived, in June 110,000, in July 175,000, in August 160,000, in 
September 320,000, in October 240,000, and in November 180,000. The 
supplies which in May and June amounted to 120,000 tons, reached 150,000 
in July, 180,000 in August, 230,000 in September, and reached the max- 
imum of 400,000 tons in October, when the movement of troops slowed up. 

Furthermore the transportation requirements which resulted from these 
arrivals were irregular in another respect. Troops and supplies were not 
moved regularly from the same ports. The movement from Brest alone 
was relatively progressive, but Cherbourg went from 3,000 men in June to 
39,000 in July and as many in August. From Saint-Nazaire in October 
twice as many were forwarded as in September, and from Le Havre one- 
half as many. It must be stated that in order to avoid the submarines the 
American troop ships crossed in convoys which caused irregular arrivals 
and which brought to Brest, for example, as many as 40,000 men at once. 
As the camp at Pontanezen could not house them it was necessary to send 
them promptly into central France in order to release the ships, and often 
to forward them to camps located at a considerable distance. 

Finally, in addition to unnecessary transportation, 
riecemeai there were the small shipments. The constant growth 

Transportation. . , , ^ , , . 

in the number oi troops and the consequent increase 
in the tonnage of supplies obliged the Americans to multiply their plants, 
warehouses, stores, shops, schools and hospitals, and to scatter them still 
more over France. From this followed a multitude of small shipments, too 
small to require full trains. "One switching list made up September 3 
1918 at Is-sur-Tille," says Colonel Andriot, "shows that 720 cars were 
from 92 different points of origin, of which seven had cars enough for com- 
plete trains and had made them up. A detailed examination of the prob- 
lem did not disclose how other complete trains could have been made, ex- 
cept by combining those from certain yards more or less widely separated." 



24 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

Those cars or cuts of cars which could not be moved in the regular current 
of traffic were known as "wild cars" and went to load up the French com- 
mercial trains and classification yards. They were nearly one-half of the 
cars loaded for the American Army. 

B. TRANSPORTATION FROM THE FRONT. 

Almost equally important, but susceptible of better control, 
Woitndea, ^^^.^ ^j^g movements from the front which were under three 
heads; wounded, men on leave, and deconcentration, the first constant, the 
second beginning with the spring of 1918, and the third after the armistice. 

"The sick and wounded of the American Army are taken from the front 
to the hospitals established in central France and located to the greatest 
possible extent along the lines of communication and at the ports. These 
hospitals, installed in buildings turned over by the French authorities or 
built entirely of barracks and often served by special spur tracks on which 
two or three trains can be handled at once, are located at Beaudesert near 
Bordeaux, Savenay near Saint-Nazaire, Allerey, Beaune, etc. They re- 
quired a movement of hospital trains which reached its maximum in Sep- 
tember and October 1918, following the American battles of Saint-Mihiel 
and Meuse-Argonne. The wounded are divided between the different hos- 
pitals by the chief medical officers of the zone of the advance and of the 
district of Paris. Certain runs are made so regularly as to justify fixed 
train schedules. These are from Paris to Bordeaux, Nantes and Rennes." 

"Excellent cars with six wheel trucks, built in England, make up the 
American hospital trains which, since the armistice, are nineteen in number. 
Each train contains sixteen cars with a capacity for 400 sick or wounded 
lying down." (Andriot.) 

For men on leave (the American command had established the 
Men on principle of a week's leave every six months) the American 
authorities arranged zones which had sufficient accommodations 
and certain amusements. The districts selected were Savoie, Bretagne (in 
the vicinity of Saint Malo) I'Auvergne, I'Ardeche (Vals) and the Riviera, 
which could receive 14,100 men on leave at one time. Arrangements were 
being made to accommodate 12,300 more on the Riviera, at Lamalou in the 
Pyrenees, and in Normandy, when the armistice was signed. These men 
on leave were first moved on regular passenger trains, but later on special 
trains, which, for those coming from the front, started at Is-sur-Tille, where 
a consolidating station was arranged following the French system. 

All these movements were unimportant in comparison 
Deconcentration, ^j^h the deconcentration which, from November 
1918 to August 1919, required 1,929 trains. Of these 1,800 were for 
troops and carried 2,414,412 men, and 129 for equipment (66 of artillery 
and munitions, 24 of engineers' material, 19 of miscellaneous, 16 of cap- 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 25 

tured German war equipment and 4 of aeroplanes). The movement fol- 
lowed an almost regular progression, reaching its maximum in May with 
over 400 trains. On September 8 1919, of the three organized armies, six 
reserve divisions and the great services of the rear, there only remained to 
be moved 35,000 men. 

On November 16 1918, General Order 355 directed the 16th Division 
of Infantry to entrain at Corbie for Le Mans. It went by Amiens, Mon- 
terolier-Buchy, Sotteville, Conches and Laigle. A few days later it was 
followed by the 27th Division and the headquarters of the Second Corps. 
The troops were usually sent first to a camp especially organized to re- 
ceive them, Saint-Aignan or Le Mans, and then, when there was vacant 
space, to the ports at Brest, Saint-Nazaire or Bordeaux. Marseille only 
handled about 38,000 men which were carried on Italian ships between 
January and April 1919. Le Havre handled a few detachments. 

"The most curiously organized of the embarkation camps is that at 
Pontanezen near Brest. Designed for 100,000 men, it is made up of inde- 
pendent sections with accommodations for 5,000 men each, either in bar- 
racks or under tents. The men on arrival pass through a receiving station, 
called 'Model Mill', where they successively receive a hair-cut, are bathed, 
dried, physically examined and are newly outfitted. The theoretical ca- 
pacity is 20,000 men per day and in practice it has reached 12,000. The 
men thereafter live in their sections for from two days to two weeks depend- 
ing on the vessel movement. About 900,000 men have passed through from 
November 1918 to August 1919." (Andriot.) 

The trains used were made up of 34 especially equipped cars as fol- 
lows: 2 baggage cars, 2 coaches, 28 thirty-ton box cars each carrying 58 
men (a total of 1,324 men) and at the rear 2 cook cars. The latter were 
absolutely necessary for trips lasting sixty-eight hours, as was the case for 
the units coming from Coblenz to Brest, a distance of 1,400 kilometers. 
It might have been possible to save a few hours by using the most direct 
routes instead of sending the trains, as was almost always done, by the 
American lines of communication. However in this way it was possible 
to use the crews and locomotives of the Transportation Corps, instead of 
the French motive power of which there was little available. Besides a 
greater regularity was anticipated from the practice, and in this no mistake 
was made, as subsequent events proved. 

V. CONCLUSION. 

The Burden Rested It should be understood first of all that the 

Principally on the burden of American transportation rested for 

French Railroads. ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^j^^ French railroads. The 

American Army never handled more than one-half of its traffic even after 



26 THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

the armistice. This could not be otherwise because of the distribution of 
the American establishments over all, or nearly all, of France, and farther 
because of the delay in the receipt of cars and locomotives from America 
after the German ofifensive of March 1918. Finally, a number of trains 
called "American" were made up of French cars and moved by French 
locomotives. 

On December 31 1918 Mr. Felton, the Director General of Military 
Railways of the American Army, wrote M. Claveille, then the French Min- 
ister of Public Works, a letter regarding the services of the French rail- 
roads, from which the following is quoted, "Words are powerless to ex- 
press to you my congratulations for the magnificent work which you have 
done in France and for your cordial cooperation with our country in our 
effort to contribute our share to the victory." 

, , . Now the transportation required by the American Army 

Burden was ^^^ considerable. It will be sufficient to recall that in 
November 1918 the effectives reached about 2,000,000 
and that enormous stocks of every sort of supplies had come with them. 

Made up, not only of what was indispensable for the life of armies but of 
all sorts of things, from typewriters and moving picture machines to dental 
apparatus, the American tonnage loaded in cars at the French ports for the 
American Army amounted in September 1918 to 226,000 tons. Troop 
transportation having been less heavy in October 1918 the tonnage in- 
creased to 410,000 tons. 

To summarize in a concrete and striking way, the American Army in 
October 1918 unloaded in France, for every minute of the day and night, 
an average of seven men, two horses and seven tons of freight. 

During this month, on the P. O. system alone, the Americans loaded 
31,000 cars, of which over 17,000 were loaded at the ports. The warehouse 
station at Gievres alone received 25,327 cars and reforwarded to the armies 
15,183. 

Once in France these troops and supplies gave birth to a series of trans- 
portation movements greatly exceeding the total obtained by estimating that 
each man or unit of freight was moved once from the port of arrival to the 
front or other destination. 

The men, either singly or in groups, made numerous trips in all direc- 
tions for instruction, rest, consolidation, to take charge of equipment, to 
change their assignments, etc. The freight was partly stored, unloaded 
and reshipped. The numerous establishments which are necessary for the 
supply and for the various needs of a modern army multiplied themselves 
everywhere in France. 

If the largest part of the food supplies and of the individual equipment 
came from America, the explosives, cannon, aeroplanes, certain supplemen- 



THE FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 27 

tary food supplies, much raw oaaterial and various small articles were 
bought in France. 

It is therefore not surprising that, only counting the full train loads in 
the direction of the loaded movement and in the zone of the S. O. S. alone, 
the number of train kilometers on the State, P. O. and P. L. M. systems in- 
creased from 125,000 in April to 667,283 in November 1918. On October 
3, 72 trains were dispatched, 51 of which carried supplies and 21 troops. 
Their average run was 408 kilometers, or a total of 29,360 train-kilometers. 
Transportation of such importance, of such density and so 
tyOngesiwn. jong continued, which imposed on four different systems 
long movements across lines either overloaded or insufficiently equipped, 
could not be handled without interruption and congestion. The demand 
on the railroads was exceptional beginning with the winter of 1917-1918, 
just at the time when it was necessary to send troops to Italy and to pro- 
vide France with coal, and during a period when the battles were almost un- 
interrupted. 

It cannot be denied that in July and August 1918 a very critical situ- 
ation existed in the principal terminals, which were blocked by the large 
number of trains, and especially by less than car load shipments, and in- 
sufficiently equipped or not yet enlarged because of delays in the execution 
of improvements under way. 

If one could have looked down from an eminence upon the large inter- 
mediate yards, such as Saint-Pierre-des-Corps or Vierzon, he would have 
seen their extensive trackage filled with trains waiting for a clear block to 
move out on the main line, in spite of the care which had been taken to re- 
lieve Vierzon by diverting via Poitiers the Bordeaux-Gievres-Saint-Dizier 
and Nantes-Chatillon-sur-Seine trains. 

On the main tracks too, the trains moved in a procession from block 
to block, awaiting their turn to enter and leave. 

As soon as a track was cleared by a departing train another took its 
place and if the conductors or engineers were questioned they would report 
that they had been in charge of the same trains for eighteen or twenty hours 
without opportunity for rest. 

It was the loyalty of the staff, despite some failures, the American as- 
sistance, and above all the progressive improvement in the organization, that 
triumphed, not only over these conditions, but also over the too individual- 
istic spirit of the French railroads and their facilities only just sufficient 
for the ordinary and normal traffic. 

After all, despite interference by the most essential commercial busi- 
ness and by passenger traffic, the flood of Americans and their supplies, 
confined to two narrow canals, broke its way through. Their trains ar- 
rived with sufficient regularity and, in the last analysis, with delays not ex- 



28 THK FRENCH RAILROADS AND THE WAR 

ceeding a few hours. Soldiers, war equipment and supplies were sent 
where they were needed without the combatant forces ever dreaming that 
those behind the front might not be able to forward every day reinforce- 
ments and food. 

Finally, if a single directing force had made itself positively felt over 
the entire system of communication from the shores of France, and perhaps 
from America, to the Lorraine front; if furthermore necessary construction 
in the terminals of central France had been completed more rapidly, it is 
probable that the results would have been better. 



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